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Does The Dao Support Individual Autonomy And Human Rights? 
 In the United States, “freedom” is arguably one of the most defining features of American 
culture and politics. Indeed, the U.S. National Anthem proudly describes the American flag wav-
ing over “the land of the free and the home of the brave. ” This freedom is captured in the form of 1
political and civil rights. These include the right to vote, to be free from discrimination based on 
gender, race, or sexuality; to free speech, religion, association, assembly, and press. These politi-
cal and civil liberties are embodied in what the UDHR classifies as “first generation rights.” 
However, such freedoms are foreign to many Asian nations, namely those that identify with Con-
fucianism.  For instance, China is one such nation that identifies with Confucianism  and also 2 3
denies the first generation rights to its peoples. In the 2014 World Report on Human Rights, it 
was noted that China “places arbitrary curbs on expression, association, assembly and religion; 
prohibits independent labor unions and human rights organizations; and maintains Party control 
over all judicial institutions. ” 4
 Why are first generation rights so strongly promoted in the West, but condemned by Con-
fucian nations? Essentially, the West values the first generation rights because such rights pro-
vide individuals with the ability to make their own choices and be autonomous. Although the 
 "The Star-Spangled Banner: The Flag That Inspired The National Anthem." Smithosonian. http://amhistory.si.e1 -
du/starspangledbanner/the-lyrics.aspx.
 Fukuyama, Francis. "Confucianism and Democracy." Journal of Democracy 6.2 (1995): 20-33. See esp. pg. 232
 Gardels, Nathan. "Xi Launches Cultural Counter-Revolution to Restore Confucianism as China's Ideology." The3 -
WordPost. Huffington Post, n.d. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-gardels/xi-jinping-confucianis-
m_b_5897680.html>.
 "World Report 2014: China." Human Rights Watch. http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/4
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concept of having a choice sounds appealing, it is also easy to realize that not every choice is a 
good one. Naturally, having a choice presupposes the fact that someone can choose what is good, 
what is bad, or something in between. Essentially, because within freedom lies the risk of choos-
ing what is bad, Confucian nations do not glorify it like the United States does. In his article “The 
Confucian Conception of Freedom,” Chenyang Li explains that freedom is not a “supreme value” 
in Chinese thought.   Rather than valuing the condition of being able to choose between good 5
and bad, Li explains, Confucians value the ideal of choosing only the good. Indeed, he says that 
Confucians praise one “for choosing [only] the good, not for choosing between good and bad.”  6
 In addition to the good being an ideal for Confucians to achieve, it is also a right. In her 
article “A Confucian Approach to Human Rights,” May Sim explains that because of Confucian-
ism’s emphasis on relationships, all people in a Confucian society are obligated to help others 
achieve any “Confucian goods” that may exist.  Conversely, all people are entitled to pursue 7
such goods. In effect, the good becomes a right to which all Confucian people are entitled. As 
Sim succinctly explains, since “there are basic goods and an obligation to foster them, then there 
are ‘basic’ or human rights.”  8
What is the Good? 
 Li, Chenyang. "The Confucian Conception of Freedom." Philosophy East and West 64, no. 4 (2014): 902-19. See 5
esp. pg. 912
 Ibid, see esp. pg. 9126
 Sim, May. "A Confucian Approach to Human Rights." History of Philosophy Quarterly 21, no. 4 (2004): 337-56. 7
See esp. pg. 348
 Ibid, See esp. pg. 3488
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 Although it is clear that Confucians have the right to achieve the good, to what exactly 
does the “good” refer? Naturally, many things can be classified as “good.” But in order to pursue 
them, one must first have a recognition of what, exactly, the Confucian conception of “good” is.  
By discerning what the good is, one can then determine the rights to which all Confucians are 
entitled. 
 In his book Confucianism—the Secular as Sacred, Herbert Fingarette agrees that the good 
of every Confucian is to follow the Dao. Indeed, he says that “following of the Way…is of ulti-
mate and absolute value. ” However, according to Fingarette, the Dao does not offer any cross9 -
roads. Rather, it is a strict, one-way street structured by ritual propriety (li).  In effect, Confu10 -
cians lack a true ability to make choices when it comes to pursuing it; “either one follows the 
Way or one fails…neither the doctrine nor the imagery [of the Dao] allows for choice…there is 
presumed to be only one right thing to do.”  Given the static nature of the Dao, Fingarette con11 -
cludes that Confucians do not have the ability to be autonomous in following it. 
 Although I agree with Fingarette’s claim that the good of every Confucian is to follow the 
Dao, I disagree with his view that the Dao discourages individual autonomy. From my reading of 
Confucianism’s Four Books, I have concluded that the Dao not only has space for individual au-
tonomy, but actually requires it. However, in order for individuals to be autonomous, they need 
to be granted with the first generation rights. 
What Is The Dao? 
 Fingarette, Herbert. Confucius--the Secular as Sacred. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. See esp. pg. 20-229
 Ibid, See. esp. pg. 19-2010
 Ibid, See esp. 2111
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 In order for one to be able to follow the Dao, one must first understand what, exactly, the 
Dao is. “Dao” is translated as the “Way,” but can refer to “the right Way of life, the Way of gov-
erning, the ideal Way of human existence, [and] the Way of the cosmos. ” However, it most of12 -
ten refers to the Way in which society is ruled and organized.  Since this essay focuses on the 13
rights of the individual in a Confucian society, we should discern the Dao in this latter context. 
Naturally, all governments are ruled and organized in order to achieve a certain goal. According 
to the Great Learning, the goal of every Confucian society is also “to illustrate illustrious virtue; 
to renovate the people; and to rest in the highest excellence. ” Ultimately, if the goal of every 14
Confucian society is to exhibit virtue, then the Dao of a Confucian society is to illustrate virtue. 
 If the Dao refers to an illustration of virtue, then the aim of all Confucians should be to 
cultivate virtue. Such a task is certainly possible because, according to the Mengzi, human nature 
is to become virtuous. Indeed, Mengzi says that all humans have within their hearts certain feel-
ings: compassion, disdain, deference, and approval and disapproval.  These feelings are impor15 -
tant because they are the “sprouts” of virtues. Compassion is the sprout of benevolence; disdain 
is the sprout of righteousness; deference is the sprout of propriety; approval and disapproval is 
the sprout of wisdom.  16
 Ibid, See esp. pg. 1912
 Van Norden, Bryan W. The Essential Mengzi: Selected Passages with Traditional Commentary. Indianapolis: 13
Hackett, 2009. See esp. pg. 141
 Tzu, K'ung-fu. Confucius: The Great Learning. Trans. James Legge. N.p.: Forgotten Books, 2007. Print. See Pg. 14
1
Mengzi 2A 6.415
Mengzi 2A 6.516
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How Does One Cultivate Virtue 
 Although it is clear that all humans can cultivate the virtue necessary to follow the Dao, 
does Confucianism offer any explanation on how this is done? Essentially, how is virtue cultivat-
ed? According to the Great Learning and the Analects, people can cultivate virtue by acquiring 
knowledge and observing ritual propriety (li). Indeed, in the Great Learning Confucius says that 
in order for people to cultivate their persons, they must “first rectif[y] their hearts…s[eek] to be 
sincere in their thoughts…[and] extend to the utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowl-
edge lay in the investigation of things.”  Essentially, in order for the people to cultivate the 17
virtue for which the Dao calls, the people need to begin by extending their knowledge and inves-
tigating reality. However, since following the Dao is the good to which all Confucians are enti-
tled, then a Confucian society has an obligation to provide its people with education. In order to 
ensure that all people have the right to education, a Confucian society ought to provide them 
with the second generation rights. This generation of rights is social, economic, and cultural in 
nature; they include the right to education, housing, health, or employment. Essentially, since a 
right to education is a second generation right, a granting of this rights will ensure that Confucian 
citizens can obtain the knowledge necessary to cultivate virtue and follow the Dao.   
 The Analects also lays out a clear formula for how one can cultivate virtue. Indeed, Con-
fucius says that observing ritual propriety allows one to achieve the highest Confucian virtue, 
ren: 
 Through self-discipline and observing ritually property one becomes authoritative [ren]  
 in one’s conduct. Do not look at anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety;  
 Tzu, K'ung-fu. Confucius: The Great Learning. Trans. James Legge. N.p.: Forgotten Books, 2007. See Pg. 117
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 do not listen to anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety; do not speak  
 about anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety; do not do anything that  
 violates the observance of ritual propriety.    18
Ren can be translated as authoritative conduct, benevolence, or humaneness, and refers to a 
“graded love for all human beings.”  Since ren is the summation of human virtue,  one’s ability 19 20
to practice this virtue will have the largest effect on one’s ability to follow the Dao. Indeed, 
Mengzi says that “The Way [Dao] is simply to harmonize with benevolence [ren] and put it into 
words.”  Essentially, if a Confucian society is obligated to help its citizens follow the Dao, then 21
it should promote ritual propriety (li). Moreover, a Confucian government can encourage the 
people to observe ritual propriety by promoting the second generation rights. Indeed, since li 
refers to a society’s cultural practices, and the second generation rights embody a society’s cul-
tural rights, then by promoting this generation of rights a Confucian government can effectively 
promote ritual propriety (li).  
 Ultimately, it is clear that one can cultivate virtue by gaining knowledge and observing li. 
However, since the right to education and culture are captured in the second generation rights, 
then it is clear that a Confucian government ought to provide its citizens with this generation of 
rights.   
 Analects, 12.118
 Sim, May. Harmony and the Mean in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Zyongyong to Remastering Morals with 19
Aristotle and Confucius, 100-33. N.p.: Cambridge UP, 2007. See esp. pg. 117
 Van Norden, Bryan W. The Essential Mengzi: Selected Passages with Traditional Commentary. Indianapolis: 20
Hackett, 2009. See esp. pg. 137
 Mengzi, 7B16.121
  !7
The Dao And Autonomy 
 At this point, Fingarette’s conclusion about the Dao is easy to understand. Again, Fin-
garette views the Dao as a single path with virtually no room for any choice or freedom. This 
explanation seems logical because the characteristics of the Dao do seem specific—in order to 
follow it, one must illustrate virtue, become educated, and adhere to society’s norms and customs 
embodied in ritual propriety (li). With such a specific prescription of the Dao, is there any room 
for independent choice? Despite the fact that the Dao seems fixed, the Mengzi and the Analects 
explain how it also requires individual autonomy. 
 According to the Mengzi, there is another virtue, yi (righteousness/appropriateness), that 
is imperative to one’s ability to follow the Dao. Yi refers to one’s ability to avoid “what is shame-
ful or dishonorable, even when one could acquire wealth or social prestige in doing so.”  Ac22 -
cording to Mengzi, practicing yi allows one to achieve ren. “Where does he dwell? Benevolence 
[ren]. Where is his path? Righteousness [yi]. ” Moreover, in other passages, he explains that 23
practicing yi allows one to follow the Dao. He says, “To want to meet the worthy without ac-
cording with the Way [Dao] is like wanting someone to enter while shutting the door. Right-
eousness [yi] is the path and propriety (li) is the door.”  24
 Although it is clear that yi is necessary to follow the Dao, what does this have to do with 
autonomy? As it turns out, the appropriate (yi) action varies depending on one’s social role. For 
 Van Norden, Bryan W. The Essential Mengzi: Selected Passages with Traditional Commentary. Indianapolis: 22
Hackett, 2009. See esp. pg. 140
 Mengzi, 7A33.323
 Mengzi, 5B7.824
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instance, in the story of Feng Fu, Feng Fu is mocked for helping a mob catch a tiger because he 
is a distinguished official. “Feng Fu rolled up his sleeves and got out of his carriage to assist with 
the tiger. The mob was pleased, but those who were officials laughed at him.”  We can conclude 25
that Feng Fu’s behavior is not appropriate for his role as an official because Mengzi uses this sto-
ry to explain to Chen Zhen why his own social role does not permit him to ask for famine relief.  
 Yi is also situational; since no two situations are exactly alike, the appropriate action can 
vary by situation. For instance, imagine if the tiger was going after Feng Fu’s mother. Since xiao 
(filial piety) is one of the most important Confucian virtues, it would be more appropriate (yi) for 
Feng Fu to try to save his mother by capturing the tiger than it would be for him to behave like 
an official. Therefore, in order to ensure that Confucian citizens have the ability to choose the 
appropriate action, they need to have the ability to think autonomously. In this hypothetical story 
of Feng Fu, Feng Fu certainly needed to make an independent choice in order to perform the ap-
propriate (yi) action. However, since the ability to be autonomous lies in the first generation 
rights, then Confucian citizens will need this generation of rights in order to exercise yi. Without 
such freedoms embodied in the first generation rights, Confucian citizens may be discouraged, 
mocked, or even legally restrained from the ability to practice yi. Again, an ability to practice yi 
is important because it allows one to follow the Dao. Ultimately, since it is clear that the first 
generation rights allows one to fully exercise yi and follow the Dao, then a Confucian govern-
ment should grant its citizens with this generation of rights. 
 The Analects also provides evidence that the Dao requires a degree of individual auton-
omy.  Indeed, Confucian says that Dao can be “broadened:” “It is the person who is able to 
 Mengzi, 7B23.225
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broaden the way (Dao), not the way that broadens the person.”  If it is true that people can 26
broaden the Dao, then they need the institutional space in which they can do so. However, since 
the Dao refers to the way in which society is ruled and organized, then citizens will only be able 
to broaden it if they have access to the first generation rights. Only through the right to vote and 
the freedoms of press, speech, and assembly can Confucian citizens have the appropriate means 
to broaden the Way in which society is ruled and organized. 
 In a later passage, Confucian also explains that the Dao is able to grow from the junzi. 
Indeed, he says, “Exemplary persons (junzi) concentrate their efforts on the root, for the root hav-
ing taken hold, the way (Dao) will grow therefrom. ” Junzi can be translated as a “superior” or 27
“exemplary” person, and refers to someone who is extremely virtuous. The ability for the Dao to 
grow from the junzi is noteworthy because, even though the junzi has cultivated enough virtue to 
follow the Dao with precision, it is clear that he or she is still able to expand upon it. More im-
portantly, it should be mentioned to that all people have the potential to become a junzi. Accord-
ing to the Zhongyong: 
 The proper way (dao) of exemplary persons (junzi) is both broad and hidden. The dullest  
 of ordinary men and women can know something of it, and yet even the sages (sheng- 
 ren) in trying to penetrate its furthest limits do not know it all. The most unworthy of  
 common men and women are able to travel a distance along it, yet even the sages in  
 trying to penetrate to its further limits are not able to travel it all…The proper way of  
 Analects, 15.2926
 Analects 1.227
  !10
 exemplary persons has its start at the simple lives of ordinary men and women, and at  
 its furthest limits sheds light upon the entire world.  28
Ultimately, since all people have the potential to become a junzi, then it follows that the Dao can 
grow from all people. 
 Further supporting the idea that all people have an ability to contribute to the Dao is 
Analects 19.22, in which Confucius says: 
 The way (Dao) of Kings Wen and Wu has not collapsed utterly—it lives in the people.  
 Those of superior character (xian) have grasped the greater part, while those of lesser  
 quality have grasped a bit of it. Everyone has something of Wen and Wu’s way in them.  
 Who then does the Master not learn from? Again, how could there be a single constant  
 teacher for him?   29
Despite the fact that Confucius is a sage, he is still able to learn more about the Dao from the 
people. This has significant implications on a Confucian government because, if a Confucian so-
ciety wants to better know the Dao, then it should ensure that it learns from all of its citizens. 
However, in order for a Confucian government to learn from its people, it needs to provide them 
with means of expression. Essentially, since the first generation rights provide one with the ap-
propriate means to express their knowledge of the Dao, a Confucian nation needs to provide its 
citizens with this generation of rights. 
 Ultimately, it is clear that all people have a potential to grasp the Dao and expand upon it. 
However, in order for them to do this, they need access to the first generation rights. Again, all 
 Zhongyong, 1228
 Analects 19.2229
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people are entitled to the rights necessary to pursue the Dao because the Dao is indeed the Con-
fucian good. Therefore, by granting its citizens with the right to participate in politics and the 
right to free speech, assembly, and press, a Confucian government is effectively granting its citi-
zens with the means necessary to achieve the good to which they are entitled. 
Conclusion 
 As initially explained, all Confucian peoples are entitled to pursue the good. According to 
Fingarette, one can effectively choose the good by following the Dao. Although I agree that the 
Dao is the good, I disagree with Fingarette’s view that it offers no room for individual choice. 
Although the Dao does require one to illustrate virtue, acquire an education, and observe ritual 
propriety (li), I also argue that it requires individual autonomy.  In the Mengzi, Mengzi explains 
that the yi (appropriateness or righteousness) is also required to follow the Dao. However, since 
yi varies by situation, Confucian citizens need the ability to make their own choices in order to 
achieve this virtue. And since the ability to be autonomous lies in the first generation rights, then 
Confucian citizens need this generation of rights in order to practice yi and follow the Dao. 
 In the Analects, Confucius provides evidence that the Dao is not entirely predetermined; 
people, in fact, contribute to its growth. However, since the Dao refers to the way in which soci-
ety is ruled and organized, then people only contribute to it through the first generation rights in 
order to contribute to it. Essentially, by participating in politics and freely expressing oneself, 
one can effectively contribute to the way (Dao) in which society is ruled and organized. 
 The Dao also supports the second generation rights. Indeed, the Great Learning and the 
Analects explain that one can cultivate virtue by acquiring knowledge and observing ritual pro-
priety (li).  However, since the right to education and other cultural rights are embodied in the 
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second generation of rights, then a Confucian government is obligated to provide its citizens with 
this generation of rights as well. 
 Although scholars disagree on the compatibility between Confucianism and human 
rights, hopefully the analyses in this research can contribute to the ongoing debates. Moreover, 
given the significance of Confucianism in many Asian countries, hopefully it can contribute to a 
shifting view of the role of first and second generation rights in Confucian societies. 
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